Myth: With Grant Fuhr making the big saves in crucial situations, the 1980s Edmonton Oilers won a lot of 5-4 and 6-5 games.
Truth: The Oilers rarely played in 5-4 or 6-5 games, and even when they did they were just as likely to lose as to win.
In the popular memory, Grant Fuhr was a goalie that bore down in the final moments of the game, shutting the door on the opposition to preserve 6-5 shootout wins for the Oilers. Unfortunately, this perception doesn't match the historical record. From 1982 to 1989, the Edmonton Oilers won a playoff game 5-4 a total of only four times, and two times they ended up on the wrong end of the 5-4 score. They won 6-5 just twice while losing three times by the same result.
Edmonton did have a very good playoff record in one goal games (26-9). That was partly because they were very good in overtime, going 9-3. It is easy to attribute a strong overtime record to the goalie, but these are Gretzky's Oilers we are talking about, and they tended to score goals quickly. Five of the 12 overtime games were decided before the teams even played 65 seconds of OT. Only four of them went longer than the 4 minute mark. Despite the impressive record, Edmonton's goalies (mostly Fuhr) had a mediocre 4.00 GAA in overtime, nearly a goal higher than their GAA in the first 60 minutes. Edmonton did well in one-goal games, but only about a quarter of their games were decided by one goal because they so often blew out their opponents. Edmonton also did very well in games decided by two goals or more (58-21).
I looked at Grant Fuhr's regular season results from 1985-86 to 1988-89 on hockeygoalies.org to try to see if they matched the playoff numbers. In games decided by 5-4 scores, the Oilers had 6 wins and 5 losses. In 6-5 games, the Oilers won twice and lost four times. I also checked out the results for 6-4 and 7-5 games just to see if I was missing something, but in those games combined the Oilers had 7 wins and 5 losses. The Oilers again had a good one-goal game record (34-21), but it was actually worse (.618) than their record in games decided by 2 goals or more (.640).
Out of Fuhr's 483 regular season and playoff games in the 1980s with Edmonton, he won only 14 of them by 5-4 or 6-5 scores, and 11 of those wins came in overtime, where Edmonton won a lot of games because their offence was so quick to score. Fuhr also lost 13 games by one of those two scores, mostly in regulation time, meaning that Edmonton wasn't really any more likely to win the close high-scoring shootouts than their opponents were.
There is some evidence that the Oilers won more games than they should have, both in the playoffs and in the regular season. From the Pythagorean expected win formula (based on goals scored and goals allowed), the Oilers would have been expected to have won 68.7% of their playoff games and 63.4% of their regular season games between 1982 and 1989. They actually won 73.7% of their playoff games and 66.6% of their regular season games. However, Edmonton platooned their goaltenders, using both Fuhr and Andy Moog. The two goalies had similar stats: Moog's GAA with Edmonton was 3.61, Fuhr's was 3.76 over the same time period. Moog also had a better winning percentage than Fuhr did with the same teams, in both the regular season and the playoffs.
So even if Fuhr was a clutch goalie, then so was Andy Moog, since Moog had better stats and a better winning percentage. What is more likely, however, that one team had two excellent, clutch goalies that led them to repeated Cups, or that the high-scoring Oilers dynasty made their goalies look like winners? Based on the evidence, the second option looks like a pretty safe bet.
Monday, July 9, 2007
Sunday, July 8, 2007
Jeff Hackett
Jeff Hackett is a great example of an underrated goalie who played well but was never really noticed because he almost always played behind weak teams.
Hackett's first four years in the league were all with very bad teams. He broke in with the New York Islanders, and then moved on to the expansion San Jose Sharks, who took only 39 points in their first season, and followed it up in 1992-93 with just 24 points. That year, Hackett faced over 36 shots per game, and the best goalie on the team, Arturs Irbe, had just an .874 save percentage, showing how difficult it was to play goal on that terrible Sharks team.
In 1994, Hackett was traded to the Chicago Blackhawks, where he was slated to be the backup goalie to established star Eddie Belfour. He didn't have a great first year in Chicago, but from 1994-95 to 1996-97, Hackett outplayed Belfour every season, including an excellent 1996-97 year where he posted a .927 save percentage in 41 games. Chicago traded Belfour to make room for Hackett, who was given the starting job for the rest of the year and the playoffs, where Chicago lost in the first round to the defending Stanley Cup champion Colorado Avalanche. Hackett had another strong year in 1997-98, starting 58 games and posting a 2.20 GAA and a .917 save percentage on a 73 point team that missed the playoffs.
After a rough start to the 1998-99 season, Hackett was involved in a blockbuster trade to Montreal. The Habs were just as bad as the Hawks, finishing short of a postseason berth more often than not. In 1998-99, the Canadiens missed the playoffs, despite Hackett's excellent play (2.27 GAA, .914 save percentage). He kept it up the next season (.914 save percentage again) as the Canadiens finished above .500, but were still not good enough for the playoffs.
However, there was a young goalie in Montreal who was pushing Hackett for playing time - the future star Jose Theodore. In 2000-01, Theodore took over, relegating Hackett to a backup role. By then the 33 year old Hackett was past his prime, and could not keep up with Theodore, who quickly became one of the league's top goaltenders, for a few seasons at least. Hackett provided Montreal with two and a half more seasons of solid backup play, before moving on through Boston and Philadelphia, and finally retiring after the 2004 season.
In his entire career, Hackett made just 10 playoff starts. Every one of them was against a 100 point team with either Patrick Roy or Martin Brodeur in the other net. Needless to say, his record was not very good - just 3-7. The average team Jeff Hackett played on had just 72 points. This was despite him delivering above average goaltending most years, and being excellent in several years in the prime of his career.
Hackett's career save percentage was .902, which is exactly what the average league save percentage was during his career. Given that this was done on losing teams, however, means that his performance was actually pretty good. The average save percentage of his playing partners was .898, and he played with some good goalies, including Arturs Irbe, Ed Belfour, and Jose Theodore. In 12 of his 15 seasons, his team finished in the bottom half of the league in scoring. He also faced an average of 30 shots per game in his career, when throughout most of the 1990s the league average was around 27-28 shots per team. These factors led to a career record of 166-244-56, despite his good performance numbers.
Jeff Hackett was an above-average goalie, and in his prime he was very good. In the four seasons between 1994 and 1998, he posted a .919 save percentage, a 2.24 goals against average, and 14 shutouts in 141 games played on a losing team, and won the starting job away from a potential Hall of Famer. Hackett never received much recognition, however. In his entire career, he only ever received one Vezina vote, a third place vote in 2000. There were better goalies than Jeff Hackett, but he was an underrated, above-average goalie who is an excellent example of a goalie that was overlooked because of the weakness of his teams.
Hackett's first four years in the league were all with very bad teams. He broke in with the New York Islanders, and then moved on to the expansion San Jose Sharks, who took only 39 points in their first season, and followed it up in 1992-93 with just 24 points. That year, Hackett faced over 36 shots per game, and the best goalie on the team, Arturs Irbe, had just an .874 save percentage, showing how difficult it was to play goal on that terrible Sharks team.
In 1994, Hackett was traded to the Chicago Blackhawks, where he was slated to be the backup goalie to established star Eddie Belfour. He didn't have a great first year in Chicago, but from 1994-95 to 1996-97, Hackett outplayed Belfour every season, including an excellent 1996-97 year where he posted a .927 save percentage in 41 games. Chicago traded Belfour to make room for Hackett, who was given the starting job for the rest of the year and the playoffs, where Chicago lost in the first round to the defending Stanley Cup champion Colorado Avalanche. Hackett had another strong year in 1997-98, starting 58 games and posting a 2.20 GAA and a .917 save percentage on a 73 point team that missed the playoffs.
After a rough start to the 1998-99 season, Hackett was involved in a blockbuster trade to Montreal. The Habs were just as bad as the Hawks, finishing short of a postseason berth more often than not. In 1998-99, the Canadiens missed the playoffs, despite Hackett's excellent play (2.27 GAA, .914 save percentage). He kept it up the next season (.914 save percentage again) as the Canadiens finished above .500, but were still not good enough for the playoffs.
However, there was a young goalie in Montreal who was pushing Hackett for playing time - the future star Jose Theodore. In 2000-01, Theodore took over, relegating Hackett to a backup role. By then the 33 year old Hackett was past his prime, and could not keep up with Theodore, who quickly became one of the league's top goaltenders, for a few seasons at least. Hackett provided Montreal with two and a half more seasons of solid backup play, before moving on through Boston and Philadelphia, and finally retiring after the 2004 season.
In his entire career, Hackett made just 10 playoff starts. Every one of them was against a 100 point team with either Patrick Roy or Martin Brodeur in the other net. Needless to say, his record was not very good - just 3-7. The average team Jeff Hackett played on had just 72 points. This was despite him delivering above average goaltending most years, and being excellent in several years in the prime of his career.
Hackett's career save percentage was .902, which is exactly what the average league save percentage was during his career. Given that this was done on losing teams, however, means that his performance was actually pretty good. The average save percentage of his playing partners was .898, and he played with some good goalies, including Arturs Irbe, Ed Belfour, and Jose Theodore. In 12 of his 15 seasons, his team finished in the bottom half of the league in scoring. He also faced an average of 30 shots per game in his career, when throughout most of the 1990s the league average was around 27-28 shots per team. These factors led to a career record of 166-244-56, despite his good performance numbers.
Jeff Hackett was an above-average goalie, and in his prime he was very good. In the four seasons between 1994 and 1998, he posted a .919 save percentage, a 2.24 goals against average, and 14 shutouts in 141 games played on a losing team, and won the starting job away from a potential Hall of Famer. Hackett never received much recognition, however. In his entire career, he only ever received one Vezina vote, a third place vote in 2000. There were better goalies than Jeff Hackett, but he was an underrated, above-average goalie who is an excellent example of a goalie that was overlooked because of the weakness of his teams.
Thursday, June 28, 2007
Hasek vs. Brodeur: Why It's Not Even Close
In 1993-94 season Martin Brodeur and Dominik Hasek both became full-time starting goalies in the NHL, Brodeur because he was a rookie, and Hasek because he had managed to get out of the Czech Republic, and was finally given the chance at a starting job. For the next decade, until Hasek retired for the first time in 2002, they were both considered among the premier goalies in the National Hockey League. Which one was better? Let's see what the numbers say.
From 1993-94 until 2001-02, Dominik Hasek faced 1,060 more shots than Martin Brodeur, and gave up 135 fewer goals.
I had to check those numbers again because I thought I had made a mistake at first. It is sometimes easy to shrug off save percentages, since there doesn't look like that much of a difference between Hasek's .926 and Brodeur's .911, but the difference shows itself in the totals. To try to quantify the gap between Hasek and Brodeur, I looked for a goalie that faced about 1,000 fewer shots than Brodeur and gave up 130 more goals in the same time period. There wasn't one, because no goalie that bad would get enough playing time to qualify. The two closest were Arturs Irbe (1870 fewer shots, 62 fewer goals against) and Jocelyn Thibault (1948 fewer shots, 77 fewer goals). Brodeur was much closer to guys like Irbe or Thibault than he was to Hasek in the 1990s. The Dominator was just on a completely different level.
Hasek was even more dominant in a team context. The 2002 Red Wings were great, but his Sabres teams were pretty average. Altogether, his teams won 343 out of 706 games from 1994-2002. The Devils were a consistently dominant team in front of Brodeur, with 380 wins in the same time period. They were not just better defensively but offensively as well, outscoring Hasek's teams by 116 goals.
Hasek's backups were 79-95-21, with a 2.96 GAA and a .900 save percentage. Brodeur's backups were 58-62-12 with a 2.63 GAA and a .900 save percentage, facing 3.4 fewer shots per game. Hasek's backups were more talented goalies, as most of them had been or became starters in the NHL: Grant Fuhr, Martin Biron, Dwayne Roloson, Steve Shields, Manny Legace. Brodeur had two decent backups, Mike Dunham and John Vanbiesbrouck, and they combined for a .911 save percentage. The mediocre Chris Terreri, backup for 5 of the seasons, was at .898, and the rest were minor-leaguers (.882).
What about the playoffs? Well, Brodeur certainly had more playoff opportunities because of the strength of his teams, playing 114 playoff games to Hasek's 90. His 67-47 record was also slightly better than the Dominator's 52-37. However, Brodeur's winning percentage of .588 was below New Jersey's regular season average of .615, while Hasek's playoff win mark of .584 was much better than his team's seasonal rate of .559, indicating that the Dominator carried his team in the postseason. In total, Brodeur faced 260 more shots and gave up 33 more goals than Hasek, which meant Hasek had a better save percentage, .927 to .922. Hasek only had one Cup win to Brodeur's two, but from 1994 to 2002 Hasek was the better playoff goalie.
So Brodeur is almost totally outclassed by that comparison. However, it is not really fair to him since the analyzed period includes his early seasons and none of his later Vezina-winning years. To compare apples to apples, let's put the two of them side-by-side at a similar age and look at their records from the age of 29 to the age of 34 (which because of Hasek's late start are the only seasons we can use to compare the two as starting NHL goalies):
Age 29-34 seasons: Dominik Hasek faced 1,494 more shots than Martin Brodeur, and gave up 41 fewer goals.
So Hasek faced almost an extra season's worth of shots, and still gave up fewer goals. Brodeur did miss his age 32 season because of the lockout, so I guess hypothetically he might have played an entire season without giving up a goal, while using his puckhandling skills to create an additional 40 goals of offence. But anything less than that, and it has to be conceded that Hasek was better than Brodeur at a similar age.
The team context is even more skewed in this sample. Between Hasek's age 29 and 34 seasons, Buffalo went 211-180-69 for 491 points in 460 games. In the same career point for Brodeur, New Jersey went 225-124-61 for 511 points in just 410 games. Buffalo scored 2.9 goals per game and gave up 2.5, while New Jersey scored 2.7 and gave up 2.3. One striking difference was in penalty minutes. Buffalo averaged 22 PIM per game, while New Jersey averaged just 11, another advantage to Brodeur who likely faced about half as many power plays.
Hasek's backups went 40-55-13 with a 3.31 GAA and an .897 save percentage, while Brodeur's were 17-15-6 with a 2.21 GAA and a .910 save percentage. Again, this despite Hasek's backups being better goalies (Fuhr, Biron, Roloson et al), as Brodeur's teammates in this period were Scott Clemmensen, Corey Schwab, J.F. Damphousse, and, for one season, the 38-year old John Vanbiesbrouck. The shot totals reinforce New Jersey's defensive strength: Buffalo's backups faced 32 shots per game, while New Jersey's faced just 24. New Jersey was a much better team than Buffalo, meaning that even if Hasek and Brodeur had similar statistics, Hasek would have been the better goalie. The fact that Hasek outplayed Brodeur by a wide margin despite the team factors shows that he was a decisively better goalie.
Hasek was also better in the playoffs in this sample. Brodeur went 44-36 with a 2.00 GAA and a .919 save percentage, stats that were about average given the low-scoring era he played in. Hasek was 28-20 with a 2.01 GAA and a .933 save percentage. Again, Hasek's playoff winning percentage (.583) was higher than his team's during the regular season (.534), while Brodeur's Devils went from a .623 regular season rate to just .550 in the postseason.
Some of Hasek's performance statistics are almost mind-boggling. It is probably only the fact that he came to the NHL late that prevents him from being a near-unanimous choice as the best ever, or at least one of the top 2 or 3 in history. He was much better than Brodeur in the late '90s, and much better at a similar age. Frankly, I think it is astonishing that anyone who followed NHL hockey in the 1990s would rank Brodeur ahead of Hasek. Subjectively and objectively, the Dominator was in a league of his own.
From 1993-94 until 2001-02, Dominik Hasek faced 1,060 more shots than Martin Brodeur, and gave up 135 fewer goals.
I had to check those numbers again because I thought I had made a mistake at first. It is sometimes easy to shrug off save percentages, since there doesn't look like that much of a difference between Hasek's .926 and Brodeur's .911, but the difference shows itself in the totals. To try to quantify the gap between Hasek and Brodeur, I looked for a goalie that faced about 1,000 fewer shots than Brodeur and gave up 130 more goals in the same time period. There wasn't one, because no goalie that bad would get enough playing time to qualify. The two closest were Arturs Irbe (1870 fewer shots, 62 fewer goals against) and Jocelyn Thibault (1948 fewer shots, 77 fewer goals). Brodeur was much closer to guys like Irbe or Thibault than he was to Hasek in the 1990s. The Dominator was just on a completely different level.
Hasek was even more dominant in a team context. The 2002 Red Wings were great, but his Sabres teams were pretty average. Altogether, his teams won 343 out of 706 games from 1994-2002. The Devils were a consistently dominant team in front of Brodeur, with 380 wins in the same time period. They were not just better defensively but offensively as well, outscoring Hasek's teams by 116 goals.
Hasek's backups were 79-95-21, with a 2.96 GAA and a .900 save percentage. Brodeur's backups were 58-62-12 with a 2.63 GAA and a .900 save percentage, facing 3.4 fewer shots per game. Hasek's backups were more talented goalies, as most of them had been or became starters in the NHL: Grant Fuhr, Martin Biron, Dwayne Roloson, Steve Shields, Manny Legace. Brodeur had two decent backups, Mike Dunham and John Vanbiesbrouck, and they combined for a .911 save percentage. The mediocre Chris Terreri, backup for 5 of the seasons, was at .898, and the rest were minor-leaguers (.882).
What about the playoffs? Well, Brodeur certainly had more playoff opportunities because of the strength of his teams, playing 114 playoff games to Hasek's 90. His 67-47 record was also slightly better than the Dominator's 52-37. However, Brodeur's winning percentage of .588 was below New Jersey's regular season average of .615, while Hasek's playoff win mark of .584 was much better than his team's seasonal rate of .559, indicating that the Dominator carried his team in the postseason. In total, Brodeur faced 260 more shots and gave up 33 more goals than Hasek, which meant Hasek had a better save percentage, .927 to .922. Hasek only had one Cup win to Brodeur's two, but from 1994 to 2002 Hasek was the better playoff goalie.
So Brodeur is almost totally outclassed by that comparison. However, it is not really fair to him since the analyzed period includes his early seasons and none of his later Vezina-winning years. To compare apples to apples, let's put the two of them side-by-side at a similar age and look at their records from the age of 29 to the age of 34 (which because of Hasek's late start are the only seasons we can use to compare the two as starting NHL goalies):
Age 29-34 seasons: Dominik Hasek faced 1,494 more shots than Martin Brodeur, and gave up 41 fewer goals.
So Hasek faced almost an extra season's worth of shots, and still gave up fewer goals. Brodeur did miss his age 32 season because of the lockout, so I guess hypothetically he might have played an entire season without giving up a goal, while using his puckhandling skills to create an additional 40 goals of offence. But anything less than that, and it has to be conceded that Hasek was better than Brodeur at a similar age.
The team context is even more skewed in this sample. Between Hasek's age 29 and 34 seasons, Buffalo went 211-180-69 for 491 points in 460 games. In the same career point for Brodeur, New Jersey went 225-124-61 for 511 points in just 410 games. Buffalo scored 2.9 goals per game and gave up 2.5, while New Jersey scored 2.7 and gave up 2.3. One striking difference was in penalty minutes. Buffalo averaged 22 PIM per game, while New Jersey averaged just 11, another advantage to Brodeur who likely faced about half as many power plays.
Hasek's backups went 40-55-13 with a 3.31 GAA and an .897 save percentage, while Brodeur's were 17-15-6 with a 2.21 GAA and a .910 save percentage. Again, this despite Hasek's backups being better goalies (Fuhr, Biron, Roloson et al), as Brodeur's teammates in this period were Scott Clemmensen, Corey Schwab, J.F. Damphousse, and, for one season, the 38-year old John Vanbiesbrouck. The shot totals reinforce New Jersey's defensive strength: Buffalo's backups faced 32 shots per game, while New Jersey's faced just 24. New Jersey was a much better team than Buffalo, meaning that even if Hasek and Brodeur had similar statistics, Hasek would have been the better goalie. The fact that Hasek outplayed Brodeur by a wide margin despite the team factors shows that he was a decisively better goalie.
Hasek was also better in the playoffs in this sample. Brodeur went 44-36 with a 2.00 GAA and a .919 save percentage, stats that were about average given the low-scoring era he played in. Hasek was 28-20 with a 2.01 GAA and a .933 save percentage. Again, Hasek's playoff winning percentage (.583) was higher than his team's during the regular season (.534), while Brodeur's Devils went from a .623 regular season rate to just .550 in the postseason.
Some of Hasek's performance statistics are almost mind-boggling. It is probably only the fact that he came to the NHL late that prevents him from being a near-unanimous choice as the best ever, or at least one of the top 2 or 3 in history. He was much better than Brodeur in the late '90s, and much better at a similar age. Frankly, I think it is astonishing that anyone who followed NHL hockey in the 1990s would rank Brodeur ahead of Hasek. Subjectively and objectively, the Dominator was in a league of his own.
Monday, June 25, 2007
Is It Harder To Face Fewer Shots?
There is a debate over whether save percentage is influenced by the number of shots faced. Some argue that the more shots a goalie faces, the more difficult it is to save them. This position was taken by Klein and Reif in their influential Hockey Compendium, and led to their Goaltender Perseverance stat that rewards goalies who face more shots per game. Others maintain the opposite, that goalies who face fewer shots have a more difficult task. This is because it is harder to stay focused, and their teammates tend to prevent the long, easy shots that other goalies face. This has often been used in support of Martin Brodeur, including in comments posted at this blog.
Neither of these viewpoints are correct. In an article on Puckerings.com, Ian Fyffe dismantled Klein and Reif's viewpoint and argued that Perseverance is meaningless. There is very little correlation between shots faced and save percentage, and the evidence is that shots faced are overwhelmingly a function of the team, rather than the goaltender. To further investigate this finding, I have looked at the top save percentage seasons of the save percentage era, which began in 1983 when the NHL began officially publishing shot totals. My findings supported Fyffe's, that save percentage appears to be independent of the number of shots faced, and that goalies can have outstanding save percentages both when facing many shots per game and when facing very few.
The average number of shots faced by goalies who had save percentages of .925 or better was 28.4 shots per game. The top 4 seasons were all by goalies facing fewer than 30 shots per game. In fact, the only goalies to face 30 or more shots and stop at least 92.5% of them in at least 50 games were Theodore, Luongo, and Hasek (3 times). Hasek is bringing up the average significantly; take him out, and the average shots against per game for the top goalies falls under 28 per game.
Several goalies made the list despite facing 26 shots or less, including Brodeur's .927 in 1996-97. Others were Kiprusoff (.933), Turco (.932), Cechmanek (.925), Tugnutt (.925), and Roy (.925).
That is just absolute save percentage, however. Save percentages have gone up and down with scoring levels in the NHL, which is why there were no 1980s goaltenders on that list. Perhaps a better way to look at it is through relative save percentage, which is save percentage divided by the league average save percentage for that season. Looking at the top 30 in relative save percentage (none of whom, of course, are Martin Brodeur), the goalies faced almost exactly a league average number of shots, and 10 of them faced 2 or more shots less than league average, including the top two (Bob Froese in 1986 and Dominik Hasek in 1994).
This list is not dominated with goalies that face a lot of shots. Of the top 30 in relative save percentage, only a few seasons fit the "Luongo" mold (lots of shots faced on a weak team): John Vanbiesbrouck on Florida in 1994, Bob Essensa on Winnipeg in 1992, Jose Theodore for Montreal in 2002, and Dominik Hasek several times on the Buffalo Sabres. Most of the goalies played on good teams.
The evidence suggests that save percentage is largely independent of the number of shots faced, and that shot quality is a more significant variable than the number of shots against. Facing a high or a low number of shots is therefore no excuse for a goaltender.
Neither of these viewpoints are correct. In an article on Puckerings.com, Ian Fyffe dismantled Klein and Reif's viewpoint and argued that Perseverance is meaningless. There is very little correlation between shots faced and save percentage, and the evidence is that shots faced are overwhelmingly a function of the team, rather than the goaltender. To further investigate this finding, I have looked at the top save percentage seasons of the save percentage era, which began in 1983 when the NHL began officially publishing shot totals. My findings supported Fyffe's, that save percentage appears to be independent of the number of shots faced, and that goalies can have outstanding save percentages both when facing many shots per game and when facing very few.
The average number of shots faced by goalies who had save percentages of .925 or better was 28.4 shots per game. The top 4 seasons were all by goalies facing fewer than 30 shots per game. In fact, the only goalies to face 30 or more shots and stop at least 92.5% of them in at least 50 games were Theodore, Luongo, and Hasek (3 times). Hasek is bringing up the average significantly; take him out, and the average shots against per game for the top goalies falls under 28 per game.
Several goalies made the list despite facing 26 shots or less, including Brodeur's .927 in 1996-97. Others were Kiprusoff (.933), Turco (.932), Cechmanek (.925), Tugnutt (.925), and Roy (.925).
That is just absolute save percentage, however. Save percentages have gone up and down with scoring levels in the NHL, which is why there were no 1980s goaltenders on that list. Perhaps a better way to look at it is through relative save percentage, which is save percentage divided by the league average save percentage for that season. Looking at the top 30 in relative save percentage (none of whom, of course, are Martin Brodeur), the goalies faced almost exactly a league average number of shots, and 10 of them faced 2 or more shots less than league average, including the top two (Bob Froese in 1986 and Dominik Hasek in 1994).
This list is not dominated with goalies that face a lot of shots. Of the top 30 in relative save percentage, only a few seasons fit the "Luongo" mold (lots of shots faced on a weak team): John Vanbiesbrouck on Florida in 1994, Bob Essensa on Winnipeg in 1992, Jose Theodore for Montreal in 2002, and Dominik Hasek several times on the Buffalo Sabres. Most of the goalies played on good teams.
The evidence suggests that save percentage is largely independent of the number of shots faced, and that shot quality is a more significant variable than the number of shots against. Facing a high or a low number of shots is therefore no excuse for a goaltender.
Monday, June 18, 2007
Did the Vezina Voters Disrespect Brodeur?
Martin Brodeur recently added a third Vezina to his trophy haul, adding another strong argument to those who defend his greatness. Others would argue that none of those Vezinas were deserving, so they should not be given heavy weighting in a career perspective.
I sympathize with the latter view, but the problem is that picking and choosing Vezina trophy winners can easily dissolve into blatant bias. For example, it is difficult to brush aside Brodeur's three Vezinas and then on the other hand, hold up Patrick Roy's three awards as proof of his greatness. In addition, goaltenders often get delayed recognition - trophies usually go to well-accomplished goaltenders, and younger goalies often lose out. This means that just because a goalie won Vezinas late in his career (like, for example, Brodeur), does not necessarily mean that he is undeserving of those honours, because he may have actually deserved some earlier awards. Many have claimed that Brodeur was ignored and overlooked early in his career, mostly because of the Devils' defensive system. When he won his first Vezina in 2003 it was widely seen as long overdue. To properly evaluate Brodeur, therefore, we need to see whether he was perhaps underappreciated to some degree in his younger days, which may balance out some of the possible overexposure he has received in recent years.
I have investigated the Vezina voting from 1994-2002, and conclude that claims that Brodeur was overlooked and discriminated against are revisionist nonsense. Brodeur got everything he deserved and much more than that as a Vezina candidate. He nearly always was ranked ahead of other goalies with almost identical statistics, even some of the best goalies in the league. He was just never deserving enough to win.
After winning the 1994 Calder Trophy in his rookie year, Brodeur was already recognizable enough to collect Vezina votes in 1994-95 with two seconds and a third place vote. Look at how eerily similar his stats were to Boston goalie Blaine Lacher, who received no votes:
Brodeur: 2.42, .902, 19-11-6, 3 SO, 24.7 shots/game
Lacher: 2.41, .902, 19-11-2, 4 SO, 24.5 shots/game
In 1995-96, Brodeur and the Devils failed to qualify for the playoffs. To be fair, the main reason for this was their lack of scoring, but not making the playoffs is often held against goalies even if they play on weak teams, and Brodeur played on the defending Stanley Cup champions. It was definitely held against Hasek, who did not win the Vezina that year despite leading the league with a .920 save percentage. This was because the Dominator was only credited for 22 wins, facing 35 shots per game on a weak Sabres team. As a result, Hasek finished 8th in Vezina voting. Brodeur was decent (.911 save percentage), but the only thing he led the league in was games played. Nevertheless, Brodeur received 4 firsts, 3 seconds, and 2 third place votes to finish fourth in the Vezina race. In the season-end All-Star Team voting, Brodeur had the second most first-place votes after Jim Carey, and narrowly missed out on a Second Team berth. Carey was a poor choice as a winner that year, and it is justifiable to claim that Brodeur should have beat him, but the best goalie in 1995-96 was Dominik Hasek, so it was not really an injustice to rank Brodeur third.
In 1996-97, Brodeur had a great season, possibly his best ever (.927, 37 wins). Unfortunately, even that wasn't enough to match Dominik Hasek. The Dominator had the same number of wins as Brodeur in the same number of games, and had a better save percentage (.930) while facing almost 7 extra shots per game. The mediocre Sabres won their division, and Hasek's brilliance was shown by him receiving 50 out of 54 first-place Hart Trophy votes. Brodeur finished a deserving second in the voting.
In 1997-98, Martin Brodeur and Ed Belfour had virtually identical seasons. The only difference was that Brodeur played in a few more games.
Brodeur: 1.89, .917, 43-17-8, 10 SO, 22.8 shots/gm
Belfour: 1.88, .916, 37-12-10, 9 SO, 22.4 shots/gm
The Vezina voters apparently saw a huge difference. Brodeur finished second to Hasek again in Vezina voting with 57 points including 2 first place votes. Belfour finished a distant fourth with only 10 points, with just one second place vote and seven thirds. This was repeated in the All-Star voting, where 47 out of 50 voters put Brodeur second on their ballots, while nearly a third of them left Belfour off their ballots entirely.
Martin Brodeur was obviously developing a great reputation, and that was reinforced the next year based on his voting results against the legendary Patrick Roy. Brodeur and Roy had identical GAAs, and although Brodeur had more wins, Roy had more shutouts and a much better save percentage. Roy received only one third place vote for the Vezina, while Brodeur was named on 11 ballots, including one first place vote.
Brodeur: 2.29, .906, 39-21-10, 4 SO, 24.5 shots/gm
Pat Roy: 2.29, .917, 32-19-8, 5 SO, 27.5 shots/gm
In 1999-00, Brodeur again beat Roy in the voting, despite posting similar numbers (2.24 GAA and .910 save % compared to Roy's 2.28 and .914) on a team that was better both offensively and defensively.
The best New Jersey Devils team of the era was probably the 2000-01 version. Playing for that juggernaut, Brodeur again piled up the wins, and the Vezina voters, as usual, took notice. Three other goalies, including Belfour again, had very similar stats.
Brodeur: 2.32, .906, 42-17-11, 9 SO, 26.9 shots/gm
Belfour: 2.34, .905, 35-20-7, 8 SO, 26.9 shots/gm
Dafoe: 2.39, .906, 22-14-7, 2 SO, 27.8 shots/gm
Irbe: 2.45, .908, 37-29-9, 6 SO, 29.0 shots/gm
Together, Belfour, Dafoe and Irbe combined for a mere two Vezina votes. Martin Brodeur got 7 first place votes and finished third in the vote totals, and in the All-Star voting he picked up 18 first-place votes and narrowly missed out on a Second Team nomination.
In the Olympic year of 2001-02, Brodeur did not have a very good year, and Jose Theodore took home the Vezina. Once again there were several close comparables to Brodeur, including Curtis Joseph and Dafoe, and Brodeur received more votes than any of them.
Perhaps the favouritism displayed towards Brodeur is best expressed by a comparison with Ed Belfour. Like New Jersey, Dallas played a strong defensive system, so the two goalies played in very similar environments. Between 1997-98 and 2000-01, both goalies faced 24 shots per game, and both got around 3 goals per game in support from the teams in front of them. As might be expected given these similarities, their performance statistics were very similar as well:
Goalie stats (1997 to 2001):
Brodeur: 284 GP, 167-75-37, 2.19, .910, .665 win %, 29 SO
Belfour: 247 GP, 139-68-33, 2.08, .914, .648 win %, 26 SO
If either of them has a slight performance edge it's probably Belfour, but the Vezina voters repeatedly sided with Brodeur, who received 124 voting points and 10 first place votes over those four seasons. Belfour had just 40 points and was ranked first just twice. In media voting for the seasonal All-Star Team, Brodeur again received way more recognition than Belfour, totalling 371 voting points compared to 123 for Eddie the Eagle. Over the four seasons, only one sportswriter ever ranked Belfour as the best in the league, while Brodeur was ranked first on 26 different ballots.
There may have been some observers who dismissed Martin Brodeur as a team creation in the mid- to late-1990s. If so, they were clearly in the minority. Brodeur got more votes than he deserved almost every year. A number of times there were other goalies with almost identical stats, and virtually every time they ended up ranking well behind Brodeur, even the best of his peers such as Roy, Belfour and Joseph.
Despite all that, Brodeur didn't win a Vezina and only twice finished as the runner-up in his first nine years in the league. The end-of-season awards evidence therefore shows that Martin Brodeur was far from dominant in the prime of his career, which makes it that much more difficult to make a compelling argument that he was the best goaltender of his generation, much less one of the greatest of all-time.
I sympathize with the latter view, but the problem is that picking and choosing Vezina trophy winners can easily dissolve into blatant bias. For example, it is difficult to brush aside Brodeur's three Vezinas and then on the other hand, hold up Patrick Roy's three awards as proof of his greatness. In addition, goaltenders often get delayed recognition - trophies usually go to well-accomplished goaltenders, and younger goalies often lose out. This means that just because a goalie won Vezinas late in his career (like, for example, Brodeur), does not necessarily mean that he is undeserving of those honours, because he may have actually deserved some earlier awards. Many have claimed that Brodeur was ignored and overlooked early in his career, mostly because of the Devils' defensive system. When he won his first Vezina in 2003 it was widely seen as long overdue. To properly evaluate Brodeur, therefore, we need to see whether he was perhaps underappreciated to some degree in his younger days, which may balance out some of the possible overexposure he has received in recent years.
I have investigated the Vezina voting from 1994-2002, and conclude that claims that Brodeur was overlooked and discriminated against are revisionist nonsense. Brodeur got everything he deserved and much more than that as a Vezina candidate. He nearly always was ranked ahead of other goalies with almost identical statistics, even some of the best goalies in the league. He was just never deserving enough to win.
After winning the 1994 Calder Trophy in his rookie year, Brodeur was already recognizable enough to collect Vezina votes in 1994-95 with two seconds and a third place vote. Look at how eerily similar his stats were to Boston goalie Blaine Lacher, who received no votes:
Brodeur: 2.42, .902, 19-11-6, 3 SO, 24.7 shots/game
Lacher: 2.41, .902, 19-11-2, 4 SO, 24.5 shots/game
In 1995-96, Brodeur and the Devils failed to qualify for the playoffs. To be fair, the main reason for this was their lack of scoring, but not making the playoffs is often held against goalies even if they play on weak teams, and Brodeur played on the defending Stanley Cup champions. It was definitely held against Hasek, who did not win the Vezina that year despite leading the league with a .920 save percentage. This was because the Dominator was only credited for 22 wins, facing 35 shots per game on a weak Sabres team. As a result, Hasek finished 8th in Vezina voting. Brodeur was decent (.911 save percentage), but the only thing he led the league in was games played. Nevertheless, Brodeur received 4 firsts, 3 seconds, and 2 third place votes to finish fourth in the Vezina race. In the season-end All-Star Team voting, Brodeur had the second most first-place votes after Jim Carey, and narrowly missed out on a Second Team berth. Carey was a poor choice as a winner that year, and it is justifiable to claim that Brodeur should have beat him, but the best goalie in 1995-96 was Dominik Hasek, so it was not really an injustice to rank Brodeur third.
In 1996-97, Brodeur had a great season, possibly his best ever (.927, 37 wins). Unfortunately, even that wasn't enough to match Dominik Hasek. The Dominator had the same number of wins as Brodeur in the same number of games, and had a better save percentage (.930) while facing almost 7 extra shots per game. The mediocre Sabres won their division, and Hasek's brilliance was shown by him receiving 50 out of 54 first-place Hart Trophy votes. Brodeur finished a deserving second in the voting.
In 1997-98, Martin Brodeur and Ed Belfour had virtually identical seasons. The only difference was that Brodeur played in a few more games.
Brodeur: 1.89, .917, 43-17-8, 10 SO, 22.8 shots/gm
Belfour: 1.88, .916, 37-12-10, 9 SO, 22.4 shots/gm
The Vezina voters apparently saw a huge difference. Brodeur finished second to Hasek again in Vezina voting with 57 points including 2 first place votes. Belfour finished a distant fourth with only 10 points, with just one second place vote and seven thirds. This was repeated in the All-Star voting, where 47 out of 50 voters put Brodeur second on their ballots, while nearly a third of them left Belfour off their ballots entirely.
Martin Brodeur was obviously developing a great reputation, and that was reinforced the next year based on his voting results against the legendary Patrick Roy. Brodeur and Roy had identical GAAs, and although Brodeur had more wins, Roy had more shutouts and a much better save percentage. Roy received only one third place vote for the Vezina, while Brodeur was named on 11 ballots, including one first place vote.
Brodeur: 2.29, .906, 39-21-10, 4 SO, 24.5 shots/gm
Pat Roy: 2.29, .917, 32-19-8, 5 SO, 27.5 shots/gm
In 1999-00, Brodeur again beat Roy in the voting, despite posting similar numbers (2.24 GAA and .910 save % compared to Roy's 2.28 and .914) on a team that was better both offensively and defensively.
The best New Jersey Devils team of the era was probably the 2000-01 version. Playing for that juggernaut, Brodeur again piled up the wins, and the Vezina voters, as usual, took notice. Three other goalies, including Belfour again, had very similar stats.
Brodeur: 2.32, .906, 42-17-11, 9 SO, 26.9 shots/gm
Belfour: 2.34, .905, 35-20-7, 8 SO, 26.9 shots/gm
Dafoe: 2.39, .906, 22-14-7, 2 SO, 27.8 shots/gm
Irbe: 2.45, .908, 37-29-9, 6 SO, 29.0 shots/gm
Together, Belfour, Dafoe and Irbe combined for a mere two Vezina votes. Martin Brodeur got 7 first place votes and finished third in the vote totals, and in the All-Star voting he picked up 18 first-place votes and narrowly missed out on a Second Team nomination.
In the Olympic year of 2001-02, Brodeur did not have a very good year, and Jose Theodore took home the Vezina. Once again there were several close comparables to Brodeur, including Curtis Joseph and Dafoe, and Brodeur received more votes than any of them.
Perhaps the favouritism displayed towards Brodeur is best expressed by a comparison with Ed Belfour. Like New Jersey, Dallas played a strong defensive system, so the two goalies played in very similar environments. Between 1997-98 and 2000-01, both goalies faced 24 shots per game, and both got around 3 goals per game in support from the teams in front of them. As might be expected given these similarities, their performance statistics were very similar as well:
Goalie stats (1997 to 2001):
Brodeur: 284 GP, 167-75-37, 2.19, .910, .665 win %, 29 SO
Belfour: 247 GP, 139-68-33, 2.08, .914, .648 win %, 26 SO
If either of them has a slight performance edge it's probably Belfour, but the Vezina voters repeatedly sided with Brodeur, who received 124 voting points and 10 first place votes over those four seasons. Belfour had just 40 points and was ranked first just twice. In media voting for the seasonal All-Star Team, Brodeur again received way more recognition than Belfour, totalling 371 voting points compared to 123 for Eddie the Eagle. Over the four seasons, only one sportswriter ever ranked Belfour as the best in the league, while Brodeur was ranked first on 26 different ballots.
There may have been some observers who dismissed Martin Brodeur as a team creation in the mid- to late-1990s. If so, they were clearly in the minority. Brodeur got more votes than he deserved almost every year. A number of times there were other goalies with almost identical stats, and virtually every time they ended up ranking well behind Brodeur, even the best of his peers such as Roy, Belfour and Joseph.
Despite all that, Brodeur didn't win a Vezina and only twice finished as the runner-up in his first nine years in the league. The end-of-season awards evidence therefore shows that Martin Brodeur was far from dominant in the prime of his career, which makes it that much more difficult to make a compelling argument that he was the best goaltender of his generation, much less one of the greatest of all-time.
Friday, June 15, 2007
Martin Brodeur Wins His Most Deserving Vezina Ever
I would argue strongly that he did not deserve it this year either, but he certainly had a stronger case this year than in either of 2002-03 or 2003-04. The voting was pretty close as well (16 first-place votes for Brodeur, 14 for Roberto Luongo).
I guess Luongo, who should have 2 Vezina Trophies on his shelf by now, may just have to wait a little longer until the point where he starts getting awarded Vezinas just because of his past successes.
I'd still bet on him for 2007-08, though. I think a key point in this debate is that while Brodeur may have had a career year this year, Luongo certainly did not, despite all the wins and accolades and so on. All he did was play on a better team. Looking at this season in the context of their recent careers, Brodeur's season looks like an outlier and Luongo's season is pretty much the same thing that he has been doing since 2000:
2000-01: Brodeur .906, Luongo .920
2001-02: Brodeur .906, Luongo .915
2002-03: Brodeur .914, Luongo .918
2003-04: Brodeur .917, Luongo .931
2005-06: Brodeur .911, Luongo .914
2006-07: Brodeur .922, Luongo .921
When Goalie A has a career year, and Goalie B plays the same way he always has, and their performances are similar, then the logical conclusion to make is that Goalie B is the better goalie, Vezina or no Vezina.
I guess Luongo, who should have 2 Vezina Trophies on his shelf by now, may just have to wait a little longer until the point where he starts getting awarded Vezinas just because of his past successes.
I'd still bet on him for 2007-08, though. I think a key point in this debate is that while Brodeur may have had a career year this year, Luongo certainly did not, despite all the wins and accolades and so on. All he did was play on a better team. Looking at this season in the context of their recent careers, Brodeur's season looks like an outlier and Luongo's season is pretty much the same thing that he has been doing since 2000:
2000-01: Brodeur .906, Luongo .920
2001-02: Brodeur .906, Luongo .915
2002-03: Brodeur .914, Luongo .918
2003-04: Brodeur .917, Luongo .931
2005-06: Brodeur .911, Luongo .914
2006-07: Brodeur .922, Luongo .921
When Goalie A has a career year, and Goalie B plays the same way he always has, and their performances are similar, then the logical conclusion to make is that Goalie B is the better goalie, Vezina or no Vezina.
Thursday, June 14, 2007
Vezina Trophy: Backup Goalies
Another way to compare goalies is to look at the performance of their backups. The backup goalies play behind the same defence, so if there are any strong team effects they often will come through in the statistics of the backup goalies. Vancouver's backup goalie is Dany Sabourin; New Jersey's is Scott Clemmensen. Neither of them played very many games, so their statistics are almost the very definition of a small sample size.
Here are their statistics:
Dany Sabourin: 2-4-1, 2.63 GAA, .906 save %
Scott Clemmensen: 1-1-2, 3.15 GAA, .889 save %
One interesting stat is the shots faced per game by the backups, which often gives us some indication of the strength of the defence. Both teams played more defensively with their backups in, giving up fewer shots against. Dany Sabourin faced 27.3 shots per 60 minutes, compared to Luongo's 29.0. Clemmensen faced 26.6 shots per game, which is about the same difference from Brodeur's 27.9. So that indicates that New Jersey is better at shot prevention than Vancouver; the difference is not just attributable to Brodeur's puckhandling or rebound control.
Backup goalies usually face an easier schedule, so that has to be taken into account. Here are the teams both faced:
Sabourin: EDM, ANA, NAS, CGY, BOS, BUF, ANA, PHO, PHO
Clemmensen: NAS, OTT, BOS, WAS, CAR, NYI
The schedules are roughly even. Sabourin faced 5 playoff teams in 9 games, including 4 elite teams. Clemmensen faced 4 playoff teams in 6 games, 2 that would be considered among the league's elite.
Taking their stats in common games only (vs Nashville and Boston), Clemmensen comes out well ahead, but that is a very small sample size.
Clemmensen: 124 minutes, 55 saves, 62 shots, .887
Sabourin: 112 minutes, 36 saves, 43 shots, .837
A single season for a backup goalie is a very small sample size. It is therefore perhaps beneficial to look at the goalies' careers for some more context.
Scott Clemmensen is 29 years old. In 2005-06, he went 3.35 and .881 in 13 games. He posted solid numbers in the AHL for the three years before that, peaking in 2004-05 with 2.81 and .916 in 46 games on a weak team. Clemmensen's AHL stats were very similar to those of Ari Ahonen, another Devils goaltending prospect who has never succeeded in breaking into the NHL.
Dany Sabourin is 27 years old. He had only 5 career games played in the NHL coming into this season. His 2005-06 AHL season looks excellent (2.26, .922), but the Wilkes-Barre Penguins were an outstanding 113 point team, and he actually had the worst save percentage of the 4 goalies on the team. However, in 2004-05 he put up similar numbers (2.22, .921) on a weaker team, outperforming current Pittsburgh starter Marc-Andre Fleury, who had a .901 mark in 54 games.
In summary, it is difficult to make any definite conclusions based on the backup goalies because of the small sample size. Dany Sabourin had a better season than Clemmensen, but past performance indicates that he is also a better goalie. Clemmensen faced fewer shots, suggesting that New Jersey is better than Vancouver at preventing shots by the opposition.
Here are their statistics:
Dany Sabourin: 2-4-1, 2.63 GAA, .906 save %
Scott Clemmensen: 1-1-2, 3.15 GAA, .889 save %
One interesting stat is the shots faced per game by the backups, which often gives us some indication of the strength of the defence. Both teams played more defensively with their backups in, giving up fewer shots against. Dany Sabourin faced 27.3 shots per 60 minutes, compared to Luongo's 29.0. Clemmensen faced 26.6 shots per game, which is about the same difference from Brodeur's 27.9. So that indicates that New Jersey is better at shot prevention than Vancouver; the difference is not just attributable to Brodeur's puckhandling or rebound control.
Backup goalies usually face an easier schedule, so that has to be taken into account. Here are the teams both faced:
Sabourin: EDM, ANA, NAS, CGY, BOS, BUF, ANA, PHO, PHO
Clemmensen: NAS, OTT, BOS, WAS, CAR, NYI
The schedules are roughly even. Sabourin faced 5 playoff teams in 9 games, including 4 elite teams. Clemmensen faced 4 playoff teams in 6 games, 2 that would be considered among the league's elite.
Taking their stats in common games only (vs Nashville and Boston), Clemmensen comes out well ahead, but that is a very small sample size.
Clemmensen: 124 minutes, 55 saves, 62 shots, .887
Sabourin: 112 minutes, 36 saves, 43 shots, .837
A single season for a backup goalie is a very small sample size. It is therefore perhaps beneficial to look at the goalies' careers for some more context.
Scott Clemmensen is 29 years old. In 2005-06, he went 3.35 and .881 in 13 games. He posted solid numbers in the AHL for the three years before that, peaking in 2004-05 with 2.81 and .916 in 46 games on a weak team. Clemmensen's AHL stats were very similar to those of Ari Ahonen, another Devils goaltending prospect who has never succeeded in breaking into the NHL.
Dany Sabourin is 27 years old. He had only 5 career games played in the NHL coming into this season. His 2005-06 AHL season looks excellent (2.26, .922), but the Wilkes-Barre Penguins were an outstanding 113 point team, and he actually had the worst save percentage of the 4 goalies on the team. However, in 2004-05 he put up similar numbers (2.22, .921) on a weaker team, outperforming current Pittsburgh starter Marc-Andre Fleury, who had a .901 mark in 54 games.
In summary, it is difficult to make any definite conclusions based on the backup goalies because of the small sample size. Dany Sabourin had a better season than Clemmensen, but past performance indicates that he is also a better goalie. Clemmensen faced fewer shots, suggesting that New Jersey is better than Vancouver at preventing shots by the opposition.
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